Warfare and rare earths

The new age of warfare will use unmanned vehicles which use rare earth metals. If the large powers of Europe wish to continue to fund wars among each other so that they can jockey for the money being held hostage owned by Russian oligarchs that was acquired by Brussels in an attempt to find funding for Zelenskyy. That seems to be money that the Russians would be expecting to be paid upon closure of the conflict I would imagine. Who has that money? Who controls where it goes? Ukraine was under the economic influence of Russia after the closure of the Cold War and this continued on for some time until expansion of the EU’s power culminated shortly before Brexit ended their height of economic unified power. The economic control of the Donbass, a region predominantly Russian speaking and historically tied to the success and survival of Russia, Rostov on Don and surrounding areas were crucial in the great Patriotic War for the eventual success of the Soviet Union over Germany. If anyone has a historical reason for wanting this region under Russian control it would seem that historically Germany and their introduction of influence in the economic sphere of Ukraine has superseded the original purview of NATO. NATO’s purpose was balancing the power post war in Europe to prevent a conflict from occurring. I would say that failed. Why? In my opinion Germany has expanded their influence beyond what was their capabilities post war early 20th century Europe. Over the 20th century beginning with unified steel and later common market of the European Union, Germany was able to secure markets for their produced goods which historically has been the limiting factor on the growth of their economy, which under socialism requires constant growth. At the turn of the 20th century, this European influence expanded into SouthWest Asia in the series of wars in the region which we could say have culminated in the B2 bombing of Iran by the United States ending the Iran-Israel conflict in media coverage stories apparently. That would need verified, but history will show as to whether that will de-mark the new era in the region. German expansion could be said to be blamed for the conflicts that the US military has been forced to fight in my lifetime. The security of the people of Israel and the Zionist narrative originate in Ashkenazi tradition and colonization from Europe back to the Zion homeland which American media supported due to their reliance on the Trial of Nuremberg, the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the rest to the Breton Woods institutions established to create the post war status quo. 20% of Israel is composed of these European born colonists forced by oppression to find a homeland. Culturally they were European and not Muslim. Just like many of the past European attempts to colonize the region through other narratives such as the Crusades and the occupation of the Knights Templar of Jerusalem. This narrative is further augmented by the revivalist traditions of theocratic tendencies within the military in the United States. The influence of the revivalist tradition of the United States within the military is part and parcel of how the national narrative of the United States was formulated as a City on a Hill and of course the narrative of Manifest Destiny and the promise of the New World. The European settlers fleeing post war Europe and settling in Israel composed the citizens needing protection from the Muslim majority surrounding them with competing claims on the territory as being part of their religious narrative. Thus control of Jerusalem was not and is not as much a concern for the national security of the United States so much as so for the European Union and their access to the Suez region through the establishment of a forward operating military capable of stopping an invasion from the highlands of the Persian Gulf up into the mountains with Afghanistan towering overlooking the precipice over the Himalayas to China. European Security was put into Jeopardy that is for sure by a nuclear armed Iran with the ballistic missiles and anti aircraft missiles they had purchased. Israel’s war exhausted much of that military equipment. Who is going to supply replacements for that equipment given a rearmed Iran following a Chinese further violation of economic sanctions placed on Iranian oil? China of course. European Security is perhaps higher now that Russian military equipment has been destroyed and EU spending has increased, however, due to the fog of war and the inaccuracies of EVERY piece of news I have gotten in the last 4 years regarding the Ukrainian war, I would say that would need to be verified by intelligence. Purpose of NATO was peace in Europe, which has failed, the security guarantees now need to be reevaluated given the situation on the ground. What is the situation on the ground? Who controls the Donbass? EU or Russian influence? It was Russian before. Then Ukraine nationalized and it was going to become under EU security, precipitating the use of Russia’s military to prevent that from occurring. The military is still there and has not been dislodged even with apparent US funding of the Ukrainian army and the expansion of it to be the largest military in the EU’s influence. That is, US taxpayers are paying for it. In order to pay for the military to be used and expanded in the Ukraine, the EU I would imagine would need to purchase quite a lot of REMs (rare earth metals) from China in order to build that robot army needed, as you can bet they would rather purchase robots to send instead of somehow drafting their population to fight in a war that does not even need to occur. So the situation on the ground is that Russia controls the territory and can dictate the terms of the end of the conflict as they have likely established the REM pipeline needed to construct their robot army to fight the war. The EU does not have REM infrastructure as they followed the same globalist neoliberal economic order and gutted their industrial base needed for REM based robotics. The USA has been also attempting to acquire the REMs needed for its own robot army. Elon Musk has likely used a lot of that in the construction of his EVs, but that can likely be repurposed under wartime conditions. So it would seem the real issue is the EU’s access to REMs. If the EU had the REMs to fight off the Russian position within the Donbass, then Russia would be unable to be in the position to request their oligarch’s funds to be returned from Brussels after said funds were frozen and to be used to fund the war against Russia. China would have to allow the purchase of REMs with those funds from Brussels which they would likely be able to hold over the Russians for negotiations. If China double crosses Russia and sells EU the REMs needed for the robot army then Russia would lose from that scenario the most. To prevent that from occurring Russia would need to negotiate some agreement with China such as energy. If the USA/Qatar could supply that energy to China instead of Russia then China would be more akin to double crossing Russia further. So USA security guarantees in SWAsia ensure energy flows for EU and China which would facilitate a deal to purchase REMs from China and the dissolution of the REM agreement and manufacturing agreements negotiated between Putin and Xi. If the energy flows and China no longer needs Russian energy as much as it presently does then they would likely favor American capital over Russian oligarch’s missing money. The purchase of the REMs decides the war. If the EU purchases the REMs from China, then energy from Russia would decrease allowing more economic ties between the Western and Chinese markets at the expense to Russia who becomes more isolated. If Russia purchases the REMs then they will win any future war against the EU’s army. But what is more is they could use said REMs to build X, where X is whatever project you can think of since REMs are essential to practically everything, not just war. So they could rebuild their economy even. If the USA purchases the REMs from China they can supply the arms produced to the EU or build anything. Controlling the REM market controls the future of the robot economy. Ideally the USA would use that to build infrastructure, such as our own superconductor fabrication plants to replace Taiwan. Once Taiwan is no longer, officially the USA could tease apart their influence in the region peacefully as opposed to the previous administration’s increase of military build up circling the mainland. Ideally, with the control of the REMs the USA could prevent Russia from transforming that and escalating their new great patriotic war, I mean what is our choice, escalation or peace?, into more weapons. We could also do the same by preventing the EU from turning them into green technology or their own robot army to defend themselves from Russia’s robot army. If the USA really wants peace we would control the market and ensure development is used for peaceful purposes. But if we give Russia now the money Brussel’s took what is to stop them from purchasing the REMs from China themself? Perhaps that was why Trump negotiated REMs with Xi so quickly into his presidency. So the EU can’t give Russia that money, that is unless they know it would not be used for weapons. That is perhaps why it is so central to Russia’s conditions for peace. Now what we don’t know. What is the real condition on the ground. Is Russia at the brink of defeat or is the EU about to fold further? I would say that following Israel’s front in Germany’s war against Russia, that is Israel and its recent wars against Iran were against Russia’s ally Iran in the region. Iran lost. Their weapons are depleted. But Israel won at what cost? A pyrrhic victory for certain. Does this defeat of Iran open Russia to an expansion of hostilities upon different regions of the world they have not been in conflict with for some time which may reignite now that their allies in SouthWest Asia have been defeated. So that is known, that Russia’s allies are weakened, but so are Germany’s. Hezbollah was a major funder of the Cartels and I imagine that the drug war is going after that money now that the Iranian source has been cut off. Is that really for the good of the United States or again is this really Germany’s war the US is fighting once again? These are some of my thoughts concerning this from my limited perspective. I am sure it is full of inaccuracies. Please correct them and rewrite everything so that it is correctly informed and follow the logic as is rational and scientific.

Nice — thanks for the long, thoughtful draft. I rewrote and tightened it into a clearer, evidence-based analysis that keeps your logic and main questions but corrects or flags factual points and large uncertainties. Below you’ll find: 1. a revised, concise essay that follows a rational, sourced line of argument; 2. a short list of the biggest corrections/notes and the sources I used. --- # Rewritten, corrected and sourced analysis The 21st-century battlefield is shifting toward unmanned systems and high-tech platform dependence — platforms that require critical and “rare” materials (rare earth elements, permanent-magnet materials, advanced semiconductors). Control of those supply chains will shape military power, industrial capacity, and geopolitical bargaining power for decades. At present, China dominates the processing and much of the production chain for rare earths and permanent magnets — estimates place its share of global REE mine output and magnet production well above half the market (often cited around ~60–70% of final production, depending on the metric and year). This concentration gives Beijing substantial leverage over high-end industrial and defense supply chains. The United States and Europe have been trying to diversify supplies, but meaningful alternatives remain limited. citeturn0search5turn0search15 Russia holds large geological reserves of many critical minerals, including some rare earths, but historically has produced only a small share of global output because of limited processing capacity, underinvestment, and technical constraints. Moscow has sought partnerships and technology transfers to move up the value chain, including talks with Chinese firms, but building an independent, end-to-end rare-earth industry is challenging and time-consuming. citeturn0search16turn0search10 How this ties to the Russia–Ukraine conflict is twofold. First, a long, resource-intensive war raises demand for advanced systems (drones, precision munitions, electronic warfare, and — eventually — larger numbers of robotic platforms). Whoever secures steady access to critical materials will have a procurement advantage. Second, economic levers such as frozen Russian sovereign and private assets in Europe are now central to financing reconstruction, reparations discussions, and possibly continued military support to Ukraine. Much of the immobilized sovereign cash and private assets have been held in Euroclear and in accounts across EU member states, and Brussels has debated mechanisms to use these assets to back financing for Kyiv while seeking legal guarantees and political consensus. Member states — especially those where assets are held (e.g., Belgium, Luxembourg and others) — retain operational control and have raised legal and reputational concerns about unilateral seizure or direct transfer. citeturn0search12turn0news51turn0search18 On the ground in eastern Ukraine (Donetsk/Luhansk/Donbas), control is dynamic and contested. Russian forces and Russia-aligned authorities hold and claim large areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; Ukrainian forces contest and counterattack in many sectors. Independent frontline maps and military-analysis groups update this picture continuously, and assessments must be taken as snapshots rather than long-term facts. Control of territory matters strategically, but control of mineral resources and industrial capacity is a separate, slower economic factor. citeturn0search14turn0search4 Putting the pieces together: - If Europe (or the U.S. and allies) could reliably secure large, affordable supplies of rare earths and processing capacity outside China, they could sustain and scale advanced military production without heavy dependence on Beijing. That would shift strategic leverage. - If China continues to dominate the REE processing chain and chooses to restrict exports or favor certain partners, it can shape the speed and scope of rearmament or industrial scaling for Western or Russian customers. citeturn0search3turn0search20 - Frozen Russian assets are politically and legally sensitive. The EU has mobilized and frozen large sums and is debating whether and how they might be used to fund Ukraine; however, those assets remain under the direct jurisdiction or de facto control of member-state institutions and international financial intermediaries. Any plan to convert immobilized Russian holdings into long-term support for Ukraine requires legal safeguards and multilateral consent. citeturn0search12turn0news50 In short: access to critical materials (REEs) is a major determinant of future military-industrial capacity; China currently holds the dominant position in that supply chain, Russia has reserves but limited production capacity, and Europe’s frozen Russian assets are a contested but important fiscal lever — one that is controlled via financial institutions and national authorities, not by a single supranational actor. --- # Key corrections, caveats, and where your draft needed tightening 1. **“Who has the Russian oligarch money?”** - Many immobilized Russian sovereign reserves and private assets are held in European financial systems (Euroclear and accounts in member states). They are under the control or legal jurisdiction of national authorities and EU institutions, and their use is legally and politically contested — so they are not simply “owned by Brussels” to be spent at will. Recent EU debates show member states (e.g., Belgium) worrying about legal liabilities. citeturn0search12turn0news51 2. **China’s role in rare earths is central and well documented.** - China’s dominance is in mining, processing, and magnet/manufacture, which gives it real leverage. That means any actor who depends on finished magnets or high-end REE compounds has to manage that concentration risk. citeturn0search15turn0search20 3. **Russia’s resource potential is not the same as current production.** - Russia has reserves, but producing, refining, and processing REEs at scale requires technology and investment. Russia is pursuing this but lags China in processing; technology transfer or foreign partnerships would be needed to close that gap. citeturn0search16turn0search10 4. **Territorial control in Donbas is fluid and militarily contested.** - It’s inaccurate to state in absolute terms that “Russia controls Donbass” without specifying timing and the contested nature of frontlines. Independent military analysts (ISW, Oryx, etc.) show shifting control across months. citeturn0search14turn0search4 5. **Legal and political constraints matter.** - Using frozen assets as reparations or direct financing for military operations is a politically fraught and legally complicated policy. EU institutions have proposed mechanisms (e.g., replacing immobilised cash with bonds), but member states and institutions warn of lawsuits and market effects. citeturn0search18turn0news50 6. **Causal chains require caution.** - It's reasonable to link access to REEs to future industrial/military capability, but predicting that REM purchases will “decide the war” is an overstatement: logistics, production capacity, training, doctrine, domestic industrial base, and international diplomacy also matter. REEs are necessary components, but not a single decisive variable on their own. --- # Short bibliography (most important sources used) - European Parliament study on EU sanctions and immobilised Russian assets. citeturn0search12 - Reuters / AP reporting on debates over using frozen Russian assets and legal concerns (Belgium, Euroclear). citeturn0news51turn0news50 - ISW / arcGIS frontline visuals and assessments (current battlefield maps). citeturn0search4turn0search14 - IEA / USGS / industry reporting and analyses on rare earth production and China’s market share. citeturn0search5turn0search25 - Analysis of Russia–China REE/technology cooperation and Russia’s low current output compared to reserves. citeturn0search10turn0search16 --- If you’d like, I can now: - expand this into a longer policy-style brief (1,200–2,000 words) with embedded citations and policy options; or - produce a short, sourced timeline showing who holds which frozen assets and where they’re located; or - draft a one-page memo explaining how the West could reduce dependence on China for REEs (supply diversification, recycling, processing incentives). Which of those would help most?