185 billion euros REMs

how much REMs could 185 billion euros buy?

That depends heavily on which “REM” you have in mind — but if you mean the cryptocurrency entity["cryptocurrency","Rare Earth Minerals",0] (REM), here’s roughly what €185 billion could buy today: - 1 REM ≈ €0.00000670 citeturn0search2 - So €1 buys about 149,155 REM. citeturn0search2 - Therefore, €185,000,000,000 would buy roughly \[ 185,000,000,000 \times 149{,}155 \approx 2.76 \times 10^{16} \] —that is about **27.6 quadrillion REM tokens**. If you meant a different “REM” (or “REM” stands for something else), tell me — I can recalc accordingly.

no just rare earth minerals in general

Good question — but it’s **really hard** to say, because “rare-earth minerals in general” is too vague for a clean conversion from euros (or any currency) to “tons of rare earths.” Here are the main reasons — and roughly what we *would* need to answer properly. ## ⚠️ Why it’s hard - “Rare earth minerals” refers to a suite of **many different chemical elements** (e.g. neodymium, dysprosium, lanthanum, cerium, etc.), each with different market prices; there is **no single “rare earth” commodity price**. - Pricing depends heavily on **purity / concentration** (raw ore vs. processed oxide vs. metal), **form** (oxide, metal, alloy), **market demand**, and **geographic, political, and supply‐chain factors**. - Spot prices fluctuate a lot, and published prices are often for **processed oxides or metals** — not raw ore — so comparisons are inconsistent. ## What you *would need* to estimate “how much” To estimate how much €185 billion could “buy” in rare earths, you’d need: 1. A **target rare-earth element** (e.g. neodymium oxide, dysprosium metal, etc.). 2. The **market price per kilogram (or ton)** of that element — for the grade & form you want (oxide, alloy, etc.). 3. An assumption about how “pure” or “refined” the material is (raw ore, crude concentrate, refined oxide, pure metal, etc.). Then you could divide €185 billion by that per-kg (or per-ton) price to get approximate mass. ## What we *can* do roughly As a rough illustration: some processed rare-earth oxides (especially more common ones like cerium or lanthanum) trade at a few **tens to a few hundreds of USD per kg** (though this varies a lot). Suppose — optimistically — €185 billion bought rare-earth material at €100/kg. Then: ``` 185,000,000,000 ÷ 100 = 1,850,000,000 kg = 1.85 billion kg = 1.85 million metric tons. ``` If the price were €200/kg — you’d get about **925,000 metric tons**. If you aimed for very cheap raw ore/concentrate at say €10/kg the same money could theoretically buy ~18.5 billion kg (≈ 18.5 million metric tons). ## What this implies - Even with very approximate prices, **€185 billion could buy millions (or tens of millions) of tons of rare-earth material**, depending on grade & processing level. - But that “rare-earth material” might not be refined metal — it could be low-grade ore or concentrate, which requires further processing. --- If you like — I can try to produce a **table**: for a few different representative rare-earth products (raw ore, mid-grade concentrate, refined oxide, pure metal) — estimate how many tons €185 billion buys, using *recent market price ranges*. That will show the extreme sensitivity to what “rare earth” means. Do you want me to build that table for you now?

proceed

Cool — I can do a **toy-table** (i.e. a rough “back-of-the-envelope” estimate) showing how much material €185 billion could buy under various plausible scenarios for “rare-earth material.” ⚠️ These are **very rough** and depend heavily on assumptions about what you buy (raw ore, concentrate, oxide, metal) and current market price. ## 🔎 Assumptions & Scenarios Here are four example “quality/processing levels,” with hypothetical (but plausible) prices per kilogram (or per ton). | Scenario / Material Type | Assumed Price (€/kg or €/ton) | What material means / Remarks | |--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------| | **Raw ore / low-grade concentrate** | **€10 / kg** (i.e. €10,000 per ton) | Crude mined ore or minimally processed concentrate | | **Mid-grade concentrate / mixed oxide concentrate** | **€50 / kg** (i.e. €50,000 per ton) | Some processing, moderate concentration of rare earth oxides | | **Refined rare-earth oxide (common REO)** | **€100 / kg** (i.e. €100,000 per ton) | Refined oxide (e.g. oxide used in downstream manufacturing) | | **Specialized/pure rare-earth metal / high-purity oxide / alloy-ready material** | **€200 / kg** (i.e. €200,000 per ton) | High purity, processed material ready for industrial use | > The per-kg prices above are hypothetical but roughly within ranges sometimes quoted for rare-earth oxide and concentrate materials in recent years. Actual market prices fluctuate widely based on element (e.g. cerium vs. neodymium vs. dysprosium), purity, supply chain constraints, and demand. ## 📊 What €185 Billion Could Buy Under Each Scenario Using €185 billion as the total budget, here’s how much mass that buys under each price assumption: | Scenario | Price | Mass of material purchasable | |----------|-------|-------------------------------| | Raw ore / low-grade concentrate | €10/kg | **≈ 18.5 billion kg** = 18.5 million metric tons | | Mid-grade concentrate | €50/kg | **≈ 3.7 billion kg** = 3.7 million metric tons | | Refined oxide | €100/kg | **≈ 1.85 billion kg** = 1.85 million metric tons | | High-purity/refined metal or alloy-ready | €200/kg | **≈ 925 million kg** = 925,000 metric tons | ## 🧮 Interpretation & What It Means - If you bought **low-grade raw ore**, €185B could theoretically buy **tens of millions of tons** of material (≈ 18.5 million tons in this simple model). - If you buy **refined oxide** (a far more processed, saleable form), the same money would buy on the order of **1–2 million tons**. - For **high-purity / alloy-ready material**, volume drops further — under **1 million tons**. This demonstrates how **processing level and purity** dramatically affect what “€185 billion” gets you. ## ⚠️ Why This Is Very Rough - Rare-earth elements come in many types (e.g. cerium, neodymium, dysprosium, lanthanum, etc.). Their market price per kg differs **a lot**. - The “mix” of elements matters: a ton of raw ore might contain only a few percent rare-earth oxides, or even less. - Additional costs would be involved in extraction, refining, transport, purification, waste disposal — real-world yields will be less than raw weight. - Market volatility: prices fluctuate a lot depending on supply, demand, geopolitics, and processing capacity. --- If you like — I can attempt to **pull up a recent real-world price list** (2024–2025) for a few common rare-earth materials (e.g. cerium oxide, neodymium oxide, rare-earth ore) — then run the same table **with real price data** (or closest available). That gives a more grounded — though still approximate — sense of what €185B would buy today. Do you want me to build that “real data” table now?

If the EU used the 185Billion Euro’s to buy a million tons of refined rare earth minerals that Russia has being supplied to them to build their advanced weapons from Chinese refiners then Russia would no longer have the ability to build the military needed to replace the military defeats in SWAsia against Iran nor would they have the military needed to dislodge whatever military is currently preventing them from advancing further in Ukraine. I would have to know the real intelligence. But if Russia does not have the funds to buy the REMs from China and the EU could use that money to undo their contract and buy up the metals themself then would that not sap all of Russia’s negotiating power? They could do it by proxy. The USA could buy the REMs from China, manufacture the weapons and supply the weapons to the EU.

Short answer: **Maybe — but unlikely in practice.** €185 billion is a huge sum and *on paper* could buy a lot of rare-earth oxide (REO), but in the real world you would hit production/processing limits, market reaction, and geopolitics long before you could quietly buy “the” supply Russia needs. Below I walk through the key numbers, the practical limits, and the levers the EU/US could actually use — with sources. --- # 1) The raw numbers (scale & affordability) - A million metric tons of **refined** rare-earth oxides is enormous relative to annual global production. Global REO-equivalent production is on the order of a few hundred thousand tonnes per year; China’s quota alone was ~270,000 t REO equivalent in 2024. Buying 1,000,000 t would equal multiple years of current global output. citeturn0search2turn0search3. - Using a simple price assumption of **€100/kg (≈€100,000/ton)** — a round number often used in back-of-envelope REO estimates — 1,000,000 tons would cost **€100 billion** (1,000,000 × €100,000). So €185B could buy ~1.85 million tons at that unit price — *if* that quantity were actually available at that price. (But see below about availability and price elasticity.) *Sources above give production scale; prices vary by element and grade.* citeturn0news46turn0search3. --- # 2) Why a straight buy-out is not practical 1. **Supply constraint vs. money** — money alone doesn’t create immediate extra supply. China currently produces and especially *refines* the lion’s share of REO/refining capacity; exports exist, but marginally buying up millions of tonnes would quickly drive prices up, invite export controls, and would likely be blocked or redirected by sellers. You can’t instantly convert cash into unlimited processed REO if refining capacity and mine output are limited. citeturn0news46turn0search2. 2. **Market reaction & strategic response** — attempting to buy huge volumes would spike prices and encourage export restrictions (or preferential domestic allocation) by China or refiners. China already dominates refining and has used policy levers in the past to manage supply for strategic reasons. citeturn0news46. 3. **Russia’s supply routes and proxies** — reporting/investigations show Chinese companies (some with state links) have supplied critical minerals to Russian military-linked firms despite sanctions, often via intermediaries. That implies supply chains aren’t only simple open market purchases that the EU can block by outbidding; they include political decisions and corporate relationships. citeturn0search6. 4. **Russia’s own plans & reserves** — Russia produces some REE but at a small fraction of global output (a few thousand tons/year today) and is trying to scale, which changes the bargaining dynamics and timeline. Building domestic capacity takes years and capital; a purchase campaign could influence that but won’t instantly remove Russia’s ability to source materials. citeturn0search4. --- # 3) Could buying up REEs “sap Russia’s negotiating power”? — conditional yes, but only with a coordinated strategy - **If** buyers could actually control the relevant processing capacity or legally prevent shipments to Russia (via sanctions, export controls on processors, or by buying up the available exportable stockpiles), that *would* constrain Russia’s access and therefore its weapons production chains. But that requires **targeted control of the refining/processing nodes** that supply Russia — not just raw cash offers. Investigations show many pathways into Russia run through particular companies and processors. citeturn0search6. - **Unilateral purchases** by the EU would likely be **inefficient** because sellers could sell to whoever pays more or be subject to domestic policy. The better lever is **export controls/sanctions on processors and traders** combined with allied market purchases and strategic stockpiling. The EU’s recent moves to build resilience and joint stockpiles show this recognition. citeturn0news45turn0search0. --- # 4) Role for the USA / buying by proxy - The U.S. could act as a buyer or processor (or fund/refine material domestically) and then supply allies. The U.S. is already investing in domestic processing and magnet/manufacturing capacity (e.g., MP Materials / DoD ties and scaling plans). But U.S. capacity is ramping — not instantly available at gigaton scales — and such moves also shift geopolitical costs onto the U.S. citeturn0news48. - Using third-party purchases (U.S. or private firms) to deny Russia might work **if** you combine purchases with **legal restrictions** preventing resale to Russia and with control of processing routes. Otherwise, sellers or intermediaries can re-route shipments or use shell companies. --- # 5) Operational realities & what “real intelligence” matters To evaluate whether this strategy would actually deny Russia, decision-makers need concrete intelligence on: - **Exactly which REE elements** Russia’s weapons programs require (e.g., Nd/Pr for magnets, Dy/Tb for high-temp magnets, gallium/germanium for electronics — different markets and suppliers). - **Volumes and forms**: kilograms of specific oxides/metals per weapons program per year, and whether Russia stocks inventories. - **Where Russia currently sources each element** (names of Chinese companies, intermediaries, stock locations, contracts). Investigative reporting shows specific supplier networks exist — but you need detailed transaction/contract intel to target them. citeturn0search6turn0search0. - **Processing chokepoints** — which firms/refineries/processors handle the conversion from ore to usable metal/oxide and are susceptible to export controls or targeted buy-outs. --- # 6) Bottom line & practical policy mix - **Money helps, but isn’t sufficient alone.** €185B could in principle buy a lot of REO at quoted prices, but the world doesn’t have that many refined tonnes available *immediately* without massive market disruption. citeturn0search2turn0search3. - **More effective approach** than a blind bulk purchase: a coordinated package of (a) targeted purchases of exportable/refined stock, (b) export controls / sanctions on processors that supply Russia, (c) joint allied stockpiles & recycling programs, and (d) accelerated investment in domestic/refinery capacity. The EU’s recent moves to create strategic stockpiles and invest in processing reflect those options. citeturn0news45turn0news48. - **Proxy manufacturing (USA buys & supplies EU)** is possible and already happening in nascent form (defense-backed supply deals), but it requires scale-up and legal measures to prevent diversion to Russia. citeturn0news48. --- If you want, I can next: - Run a **scenario calculation** using recent element-specific prices (NdPr oxide, dysprosium oxide, etc.) and current annual production numbers to show how many tons €185B could buy for *specific elements*, and how that compares to plausible Russian annual needs. - Or pull together the **investigative reporting list** of the Chinese companies and Russian buyers that have been publicly identified (useful to see chokepoints & where sanctions/purchases would be targeted). Which of those would you like me to do now? (I can pull the element-price numbers and run the math.)