Ukrainian opinion on concessions

Zelenskyy does not want to cede land. Well what do the people of Ukraine think? Why not give them a choice in the matter, like a democratic referendum. Then you can let Europe vote to fund their military or not. If Europe won’t back Zelenskyy AND he does not have the support of his people, then it will be impossible for him to continue the war. At that point Europe can decide to cut their social programs and fund a military big enough to stop Russia. Either that or they could pay back the Marshall plan and buy their weapons/energy from us. But there is no reason for the USA to fight a war in Europe. If Europe wants to peacefully coexist with Russia then they are just going to have to learn to live with each other.

You raise an important and widely debated question. There is recent polling data from Ukraine that speaks directly to what many (though not all) Ukrainians think about ceding land or holding referenda — and their views are fairly strongly against giving up territory. Here’s a breakdown of what the data shows (and the complications around doing a referendum as you suggested). --- ## 🇺🇦 What Ukrainians say now about ceding land or peace deals - According to a recent poll by entity["organization","Kyiv International Institute of Sociology",0] (KIIS), **54% of Ukrainians are “categorically against any territorial concessions” to Russia** (as of autumn 2025). Only ~38% said they would be open to “certain territorial losses.” citeturn0search9turn0search19 - Another KIIS poll (early 2025) found that **about half (50%) think Ukraine should not give up territory under any circumstance**, even if the war lasts longer, while around 39% said they would be willing to accept some territorial concessions for peace. citeturn0search21turn0search20 - Support for the idea of concessions has increased (vs earlier years), but remains a minority. For example, in mid-2024, 32% were open to territorial concessions; 55% opposed. citeturn0search15turn0search13turn0search10 - When asked about more specific versions of “concessions,” opposition tends to be strongest for formal recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia or giving up control of currently-held cities. citeturn0search9turn0search18turn0search19 - On related matters: a 2025 poll showed that **63% of Ukrainians are against holding national elections while the war is ongoing**. Many believe elections during a war could endanger defense, governance, or fairness. citeturn0search22turn0news31turn0news30 **Bottom line**: A significant plurality — often a majority — of Ukrainians oppose formal territorial concessions to Russia, especially concessions that involve legal or permanent transfer of land. Some are open to compromises (especially if framed as temporary “front-line freeze” or derogation of claims), but outright acceptance of land loss remains limited. --- ## 🗳️ On the idea of a referendum / democratic vote inside Ukraine Your suggestion that Ukrainians themselves be asked directly — via a referendum — whether to cede land or end the war is intuitively democratic. But there are important obstacles: - As noted, a strong majority currently opposes territorial concessions; so a referendum might well produce a result that aligns with current leadership positions (i.e. rejection of concessions). - However, many Ukrainians also think **elections or referenda should be postponed until the war ends** — 63% said they are against holding elections during wartime (early 2025 poll). citeturn0search22turn0news31 - Logistical & security realities of wartime: millions are displaced internally or abroad; much of Ukrainian territory remains under occupation or front-line combat. Organizing a fair national referendum under those conditions could be extremely difficult — and some worry it could weaken national unity or defense. Authorities have raised similar objections when asked about elections under martial law. citeturn0news30turn0news31turn0news29 - There’s also the risk that public opinion could shift rapidly based on battlefield developments, propaganda, or changing costs of war — so a referendum might not reflect a durable “will of the people,” but rather the temporary mood under duress. Thus while a referendum might in theory give voice to the populace, war conditions make it logistically and ethically complicated — and many Ukrainians themselves may reject it at the moment. --- ## ⚠️ Why it’s not just a “European decision / U.S. fund or not” issue Your broader framework — that Europe (or the U.S.) could fund Ukraine only if Ukrainians don’t support the war — overlooks a few things: - First, Ukrainians appear to WANT to have a say — but many also recognize that **wartime is not conducive to free democratic processes** (see polls above). - Second, the notion that Europe could “cut social programs” — or decide collectively to underwrite or not underwrite Ukraine — reduces this to a geopolitical-economic calculus. But for many Ukrainians, the war is existential: it’s about sovereignty, survival, and identity, not European budgets or U.S. interests. - Third, as long as much of Ukraine is occupied, and many citizens displaced or in the military, a referendum or vote may not give a fair or inclusive result — excluding civilians under occupation, refugees abroad, or those fighting for the country. --- ## 💡 What this implies about your premise and possible outcomes - As things stand, it seems the majority of Ukrainians would almost certainly reject formal, permanent territorial concessions — meaning your proposed “referendum” would likely mirror current policy. - But because many oppose elections mid-war, and because holding a fair vote under war conditions is problematic, democratic choice via referendum is unlikely in the short term. - So safeguards or “peace-for-land” deals that don’t have broad domestic support risk being viewed by many Ukrainians as betrayals of sovereignty — which might not achieve lasting peace, and could provoke domestic unrest. - For external supporters (Europe, U.S.), that means funding and political support remain entangled with Ukrainian public opinion, long-term social resilience within Ukraine, and the feasibility of rebuilding after war — not just temporary military calculations. --- If you like, I can **pull up 5–10 recent (2025) polls** showing public opinion in Ukraine — including regional breakdowns, age groups, war-fatigue vs idealism — so you see how opinion has evolved over time. navlistMore on public opinion & Zelenskyy-land concessionsturn0news36,turn0news35,turn0news31,turn0news33,turn0news30