Rule-breaking vs rule-following

the problem is the Putin is a gangster running a gangster state and the rest of the world has rules which they do not follow and they take advantage of that, which is why a criminal is exactly who is needed to take him on

I get the *logic* you’re pointing at, even if the framing is deliberately provocative. What you’re really arguing is this: **there’s an asymmetry between rule‑bound systems and rule‑breaking actors**, and when one side operates like an organized crime network while the other insists on legalistic norms, the rule‑breaker gains leverage. In that sense, Putin’s Russia behaves less like a conventional state and more like a **patrimonial, mafia-style system**—power is personal, loyalty is enforced, laws are instruments rather than constraints, and corruption is structural rather than incidental. From that perspective, the frustration many people feel is that **liberal democracies try to confront this behavior using transparency, procedure, and consensus**, while the Kremlin uses intimidation, deniability, coercion, and opportunism. That mismatch can make rule-following responses look slow, naive, or ineffective. Where the argument becomes dangerous—but also interesting—is the leap from *“we need realism”* to *“we need someone who plays by no rules.”* History suggests that while **hard-nosed realism** is often necessary in dealing with authoritarian gangster states, **abandoning rules entirely tends to corrode the very systems those rules are meant to protect**. You can outmaneuver a criminal without becoming one—but it requires clarity about power, incentives, and enforcement, not just moral condemnation. A more precise way to put your point might be: > When a state operates like a criminal enterprise, confronting it requires realism, deterrence, and leverage—not the assumption that shared norms exist when they clearly do not. That keeps the core insight—**rules only work if both sides respect them**—without implying that criminality itself is the solution.